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(Dated: November 1, 2018)
The quantum mechanics of closed systems such as the universe is formulated using an extension of
familiar probability theory that incorporates negative probabilities. Probabilities must be positive
for sets of alternative histories that are the basis of fair settleable bets. However, in quantum
mechanics there are sets of alternative histories that can be described but which cannot be the
basis for fair settleable bets. Members of such sets can be assigned extended probabilities that are
sometimes negative. A prescription for extended probabilities is introduced that assigns extended
probabilities to all histories that can be described, fine grained or coarse grained, members of
decoherent sets or not. All probability sum rules are satisfied exactly. Sets of histories that are
recorded to sufficient precision are the basis of settleable bets. This formulation is compared with
the decoherent (consistent) histories formulation of quantum theory. Prospects are discussed for
using this formulation to provide testable alternatives to quantum theory or further generalizations
of it.
I. INTRODUCTION
Probabilities can be understood as instructions for
making fair bets [1]. From this point of view, the proba-
bilities supplied by well confirmed physical theories, such
as classical, statistical, and quantum mechanics, provide
secure ways of betting on the regularities exhibited by
our universe. Such bets are effectively made every day in
the development of technology. Starting from this per-
spective, this paper extends usual probability theory and
generalizes the modern quantum mechanics of closed sys-
tems so that extended probabilities are assigned to every
history the system can exhibit.
No bet is complete without specifying the means to
settle it. Typically this is by appeal to a record of which
of the possible alternatives occurred. Usual probability
theory implicitly assumes there is a way of settleing a bet
on the alternatives to which probablities are assigned.
The rules of probability theory follow from a require-
ment that it not be possible to arrange unfair settleable
bets in which one party is sure to lose [1, 2]. In particu-
lar, probabilities must be positive to prevent this as we
review in Section II.
But in quantum theory there are alternatives which
can be described but that are not the basis for settleable
bets. The two-slit experiment in Figure 1 provides an ex-
ample in the context of the approximate (Copenhagen)
quantum mechanics of measured subsystems. An elec-
tron starts at a source, passes through a screen with two
slits, and is detected at a point y on a further screen.
Consider the two alternative histories distinguished by
whether the electron went through the upper slit or the
lower slit to arrive at a given point y.
If a measurement determines which slit the electron
passed through, quantum mechanics provides probabili-
ties for a bet on which occurred. A record of the measure-
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FIG. 1: The two-slit experiment. An electron gun at left
emits an electron traveling towards a screen with two slits,
its progress in space recapitulating its evolution in time. The
electron is detected at a further screen at a position y with a
probability density that exhibits an interference pattern. A
coarse grained set of histories for the electron is defined by
specifying the slit (U or L) through which the electron passes
through and ranges ∆ of the position y where it is detected. In
the absence of the record of a measurement it is not possible
to settle a bet on the which of these histories occurred.
ment outcome can be used to settle the bet. If no mea-
surement is carried out, the alternative histories going
through the upper and lower slit can still be described.
But, because of quantum interference, there can be no
record of which occurred. A bet on these alternative his-
tories is not settleable.
When there are alternatives that can be described but
do not correspond to settleable bets there are two ap-
proaches to probability. (1) Assign probabilities only to
alternatives that correspond to settleable bets in which
case the usual rules of probability theory follow. (2) As-
sign probabilities to all alternatives, settleable or not, but
allow for extensions of the usual probability theory rules
for non-settleable bets. The first approach is the one
usually taken in quantum theory, for example in its de-
coherent (or consistent) histories formulation [3–5]. This
2paper explores the second.
The essential ideas of extended probabilities in the con-
text of the quantum mechanics of closed systems were
given in [6] and are easily summarized. For simplicity
restrict attention to a system of particles and fields in
closed box and assume that the spacetime geometry is
fixed and flat. The basic input to a quantum description
of the contents of the box are a Hamiltonian H and an
initial quantum state |Ψ〉.
An exhaustive set of exclusive alternatives at one mo-
ment of time t is represented1 in the Heisenberg picture
by an exhaustive set of mutually orthogonal projection
operators {Pα(t)}, α = 1, 2, · · · . An elementary example
of a set of alternative histories of the closed system is
specified by a sequence of such sets {P kαk(tk)} at a se-
quence of times t1, t2, · · · , tn. An individual history in
the set α = (α1, · · · , αn) is represented by the corre-
sponding chain of projections
Cα = P
n
αn(tn) · · ·P 1α1(t1). (1.1)
Such chains are not generally projections themselves un-
less all of the members of the chain commute.2
Histories like ones specified by (1.1) are generally
coarse-grained because alternatives are not specified at
every time and because the alternatives at a given time
are not projections onto a complete set of states. Fine-
grained histories consist of one-dimensional projections
at each and every time.
We will take the extended probabilities p(α) for any
set of histories {Cα} to be given by3
p(α) = Re〈Ψ|Cα|Ψ〉. (1.2)
As we will discuss in Section III, the extended proba-
bilities defined by (1.2) satisfy all the usual probability
theory rules except positivity.
1 We are assuming some familiarity with the quantum mechanics
of closed systems. A pedagogical introduction to this subject
in the notation used here is [7]. Appendix A contains a bare
bones account of decoherent histories quantum mechanics in this
notation.
2 Realistic sets of histories will be branch dependent in the sense
that at any one time in a given history the set of projections
defining alternatives at the next time will depend on the specific
previous alternatives defining the history (e.g.[8, 9]). Yet more
generally, sets of histories can be defined by partitions of chains
like (1.1) into classes whose definition is not at a discrete series
of times (e.g [10]). To keep the exposition manageable we have
ignored such generalities and restricted attention to histories of
the the simple form (1.1). Most of the results extend straight-
forwardly to the more general cases.
3 This is the relation used by Goldstein and Page [11] to define
their linear positivity condition that restricts sets of histories to
those for which (1.2) is positive. We will rather use the relation to
assign extended probabilities to all histories, without restriction.
That difference should not obscure the fact that (1.2) was first
used a definition of probability by Goldstein and Page who also
discussed of some of its properties. Similar formulae have also
been discussed in [6, 12, 13].
We will take a a set of histories to be the basis of a
settleable bet if the histories are recorded in a suitably
general sense. Specifically, a set of histories is exactly
recorded if there exists a set of orthogonal projection op-
erators {Rα} that are exactly correlated with the histo-
ries Cα in the state |Ψ〉. The alternative R’s represent
the alternative values of the records. Exactly recorded
histories have extended probabilities (1.2) in the range
[0, 1]. The extended probabilities then obey the usual
rules of probability theory. With a strong notion of cor-
relation, an exactly recorded set of histories is an exactly
medium decoherent set of histories and vice versa.
Realistic sets of histories such as those defining the
quasiclassical realm of everyday experience (e.g. [9]) are
not exactly medium decoherent and therefore cannot be
exactly recorded. But they do satisfy these conditions to
an accuracy well beyond that which a violation could be
detected or, indeed, the physical situation modeled.
The relation (1.2) assigns extended probabilities to all
histories of a closed system. These extended probabilities
satisfy the usual rules of probability theory for (recorded)
sets of histories that are the basis of settleable bets. But
extended probabilities that are possibly negative or larger
than 1 are assigned to histories in sets that are not the
basis of settleable bets. From this perspective, quantum
theory consists of the specification of
• An extended probability distribution on the al-
lowed sets of fine-grained histories incorporating a
theory of dynamics (H) and the initial quantum
state (|Ψ〉).
• A notion of coarse-graining, most generally a par-
tition of the fine-grained histories into classes.
• A criterion for when a set of alternative coarse-
grained histories is the basis for a settleable bet.
In the author’s view there is no pressing need, either
theoretical or experimental, to reformulate the quantum
mechanics of closed systems in terms of extended proba-
bilities. However, such a reformulation has at least three
advantages that we develop in Sections VI, VII, and VIII.
Precision: The extended probabilities (1.2) obey the
sum rules of probabilty theory exactly. The inevitable
imprecision is rather all in the notion of settleable bet
and what exactly is meant by a record.
Assuming a unique fine-grained set of histories: It be-
comes possible to posit a unique set of fine grained histo-
ries together with their extended probabilities as a start-
ing point for quantum mechanics as it is in classical the-
ory. Examples are particle paths in non-relativistic quan-
tum theory, four-dimensional field configurations in the
case of quantum field theory, and four-metrics and mat-
ter fields for a quantum theory of spacetime geometry.
A starting point for generalization: Quantum theory
leads to one way of specifying an extended probability
distribution on a set of fine-grained histories of a closed
3system, but it may not be the only way4. Nearby dis-
tributions that differ from that of quantum theory may
be useful in parametrizing experimental tests. Quantum
theory itself could be emergent from some yet more fun-
damental theory characterized by a different distribution.
The natural occurrence of negative probabilities in the
formalism of quantum theory has been noted by many au-
thors and has a long, vast, varied, and interesting history.
The Wigner distribution on phase space is perhaps the
most familiar example [15–17]. This and other instances
of negative probability in quantum mechanics prior to
1986 were reviewed by Mu¨ckenheim [18]. Some other pa-
pers known to the author since that time are [6, 19–24].
The following view of Feynman [19] is close in spirit to
the present paper: “If a physical theory for calculating
probabilities yields a negative probability ... we need not
conclude that the theory is incorrect. ... [A] possibility
is that the situation for which the probababilty appears
to be negative is not one that can be verified.”
The structure of the remaining parts of this paper is as
follows: Section II reviews the standard argument why
probabilities have to be positive for fair bets. Section III
reformulates the quantum mechanics of closed systems
using the extended probabilities defined by (1.2) and a
notion of settleable based on exactly correlated general-
ized records. Realistic records are discussed in Section
IV. Section V describes the role of coarse graining plays
in finding settleable bets. This formulation of quantum
theory in terms of extended probabilities (EP) is com-
pared with decoherent histories (DH) in Section VI. Sec-
tion VII formulates quantum theory in terms of a funda-
mental distribution for extended probabilities of a unique
fine-grained set of histories. Section VIII concludes with
a discussion of the utility of extended probabilities for
parametrizing experiment and extending quantum the-
ory.
II. PROBABILITY
This section briefly reviews how probabilities can be
understood as instructions for betting and why they must
be positive to be bases for fair bets [1, 2]. The general
context is Bayesian probability theory5. We follow in
detail the exposition in [2].
When you assert that a event A has probability pA it
means the following: Suppose a bookie6 offers you a bet
on whether the event A occurs7 with a payoff SA if it
4 For an approach without fundamental probabilities but in which
the fine-grained histories manifest a non-classical logic, see [14].
5 For a compact introduction, see [25]; for complete details, see
[26]; for arguments for the necessity of the Bayesian point of
view, see [27].
6 American slang for bookmaker.
7 Or alternatively offers a bet on whether A occurred, or is occur-
ing, or will occur.
does. You will pay the bookie pASA and consider it a
fair bet.
The payoffs SA can be either positive or negative.
Changing their signs interchanges the roles of bookie and
bettor. A negative payoff means that you pay the bookie
|SA| at the end of the bet if A occurs. Your payment
pASA can also be negative meaning that the bookie pays
you |pASA| at the start of the bet.
Consider the simplest exhaustive set of mutually exclu-
sive alternatives consisting of an event A and the event
‘not A’ denoted by A¯. You announce to a bookie that
you will accept a bet on this set of events with any pay-
offs SA and SA¯ that the bookie may care to set, provided
that your payments for each event are pASA and pA¯SA¯
for some numbers pA and pA¯ (probabilities) which you
specify. Indeed this situation defines these probabilities.
Your gain GA if A occurs and your gain GA¯ if it does not
are given by:
GA = SA − pASA − pA¯SA¯, (2.1a)
GA¯ = SA¯ − pA¯SA¯ − pASA. (2.1b)
If you do not specify probabilities obeying the usual
rules of probability theory the bookie will be able to chose
payoffs such that you are sure to lose on every bet.8. Such
bets are obviously not fair. All the rules of probability
theory must be satisfied for fair bets. We will illustrate
the argument only to derive the requirement that proba-
bilities must be positive for fair bet since this is the main
rule we intend to modify in extending the theory. For
the rest see [1, 2].
To simplify the discussion suppose the bookie decides
to pay off only if A occurs, ie. chooses SA¯ = 0. Then
(2.1) becomes
GA = (1− pA)SA, (2.2a)
GA¯ = −pASA. (2.2b)
If your probability pA for A is negative the bookie has
only to choose SA to be negative to ensure that both GA
and GA¯ are negative. You lose whether A occurs or does
not. This is not very surprising. The positive value of
pASA means that you pay the bookie to place the bet.
The negative value of SA means that you also pay |SA|
to the bookie to settle the bet if A occurs. To avoid such
unfair bets all your probabilities must be positive.
Note that you lose on each bet, not on average over
many. Note also that a small negative probability does
not necessarily mean that you lose a small amount. If
A occurs you lose |SA|(1 + |pA|) on each bet which can
be as high as the bookie cares to specify. The bookie
doesn’t need to have an independent assessment of the
probabilities to arrange that you always lose were you to
8 The situations where you always lose are called ‘Dutch books’.
This is unfortunate terminology in the author’s opinion but seem-
ingly standard in English in economics and probability theory.
4hold negative probabilities. Ordinarily a bookie would
make money by having a better estimate of the odds than
you do. For example, if a bookie calculates probabilities
with quantum mechanics while you calculate them will
classical physics, the bookie will win in situations where
classical physics is a poor approximation. But were you
to hold negative probabilities the bookie has to know
nothing else to always win. Conversely you only need to
notice that all transfers are to the bookie to detect this
kind of unfair bet. Indeed, you don’t need the bookie at
all since from your perspective the same result could be
achieved by ripping up $100 bills.
A physical theory supplies probabilities for betting on
the regularities exhibited by our universe. Evidently
these must be fair bets! At a minimum therefore, the
probabilities supplied by physical theory must obey the
usual probability rules for bets which could be in princi-
ple be proposed and settled in the realistic universe. In
particular the probabilities of records used to settle bets
on which of a set of alternative histories occurs must obey
these rules. If these records are exactly correlated with
the histories the probabilities of the histories must obey
them too.
We next discuss extending this framework and intro-
ducing extended probabilities outside the range [0, 1] for
non-settleable alternatives. These extended probabilities
can be understood as part of instructions for betting. If
you hold such probabilities don’t bet with them! There
will be no records to settle and you risk being offered an
unfair wager .
III. EXTENDED PROBABILITIES IN
QUANTUM MECHANICS
This section decribes how extended probabilities can
be consistently assigned to every member of every ex-
haustive set of histories of a closed quantum mechanical
system. Then it explains how usual probabilities are re-
covered for sets histories that correspond to a natural
notion of settleable bets. The starting point is decoher-
ent histories quantum theory [3–5] which is very briefly
reviewed in Appendix A largely to introduce the notation
that is used.
To keep the discussion manageable, we consider a
closed quantum system, most generally the universe, in
the approximation that gross quantum fluctuations in the
geometry of spacetime can be neglected. The closed sys-
tem can then be thought of as a large (say>∼ 20,000 Mpc),
perhaps expanding box of particles and fields in a fixed
background spacetime. Everything is contained within
the box, in particular galaxies, planets, observers and
observed, measured subsystems, and any apparatus that
measures them. This is a model of the most general phys-
ical context for prediction.
The fixed background spacetime means that the no-
tions of time are fixed and that the usual apparatus of
Hilbert space, states, and operators can be employed in
a quantum description of the system. The essential theo-
retical inputs to the process of prediction are the Hamil-
tonian H governing evolution and the initial quantum
state. We assume this is a pure state |Ψ〉.
The discussion in this section is idealized in certain
respects for instance by assuming the exact decoherence
of sets of histories defining settleable bets. We return
to the inevitable approximations associated with more
realistic situations in the next section.
A. Extended Probabilities for Histories
Consider an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive his-
tories {α}. The two histories of an electron in the two-
slit experiment illustrated in Figure 1 are an example.
A time sequence of alternative coarse-grained positions
describing the various orbits that the center of mass of
the Earth might take in its progress around the Sun is
another. Each history in such a set is represented by a
class operator Cα. For sets of histories defined by sets
of alternatives at a series of times these will be strings
of projections2 as in (1.1). As is immediate in that case
[cf. (A.1)], the class operators of an exhaustive set sum
to unity
∑
α
Cα = I , (exhaustive). (3.1)
We begin with the expression [cf. (A.6)] for the prob-
abilities p(α) of an exactly decoherent9 set of alternative
histories {Cα}:
p(α) ≡ ||Cα|Ψ〉||2 = 〈Ψ|C†αCα|Ψ〉 . (3.2)
Exact decoherence means that the interference between
the branch state vectors corresponding to different
coarse-grained histories vanishes [cf.(A.7)]
〈Ψ|C†βCα|Ψ〉 = 0, α 6= β. (3.3)
This is a sufficient condition for the probabilities defined
by (3.2) to obey all the usual rules of probability theory.
In particular all the probabilities are manifestly positive.
The probabilities for decoherent histories (3.2) can be
rewritten using (3.1) and (3.3) as
p(α) =
∑
β
〈Ψ|C†βCα|Ψ〉 (3.4)
since the terms with β 6= α are all zero. Eq. (3.1) then
yields the following alternative expression for the proba-
bilities of histories in an exactly decohering set:
p(α) = 〈Ψ|Cα|Ψ〉, (decohering histories) . (3.5)
9 Whenever ‘decoherent’ or ‘decoherence’ appears without defining
qualification as here we mean medium decoherence as defined by
(3.3).
5The expression on the right hand side is neither mani-
festly positive nor even necessarily real. But it is real
and positive for the histories of exactly decoherent sets
as its derivation shows.
We now extend the probabilities defined only for ex-
actly decoherent sets of alternative histories by (3.5) to
all sets of histories, decoherent or not. To do this we
follow the proposal in [6] and write
p(α) = Re〈Ψ|Cα|Ψ〉, (all histories) . (3.6)
The real part is necessary if extended probabilitiies are
to be real numbers.10 The relation (3.6) reduces to (3.5)
for exact decoherence since then the 〈Ψ|Cα|Ψ〉 are real.
The extended probabilities defined by (3.6) are not
necessarily all positive11, nor less than 1, but all the other
requirements of usual probability theory are maintained.
In particular, extended probabilities for exclusive events
add and the most general form of the resulting sum rules
are satisfied. A coarse graining of a set of histories {α} is
a partition of the set into mutually exclusive classes {α¯}.
(See the appendix for a little more detail.) Each history
α is in some coarse grained class and in no more than one.
The operators {Cα¯} representing the histories defined by
the coarser grained classes are sums over operators rep-
resenting the finer grained histories they contain, viz.
Cα¯ =
∑
α∈α¯
Cα . (3.7)
An immediate consequence of the linearly of (3.6) in the
C’s is that
p(α¯) =
∑
α∈α¯
p(α) . (3.8)
The most general form of the probability sum rules for
exclusive alternatives is thus satisfied exactly. In partic-
ular it follow from (3.8) that
∑
α
p(α) = 1 (3.9)
when the sum is over all histories in an exhaustive set.
Allowing extended probabilities outside the range [0, 1] is
thus the only extension of usual probabilty theory needed
to assign extended probabilities to all histories that ex-
actly obey the rest of the usual rules.
Although it is not a part of the usual rules of prob-
ability theory, one other familiar property besides pos-
itivity is lost in the extension from (3.2) and (3.3) to
(3.6). This is the usual quantum mechanical notion of
non-interacting subsystems. In quantum mechanics, a
10 Some have suggested that probabilities be extended to complex
numbers e.g. [28]. We do not pursue this.
11 Indeed, if the history contains more than one time there is always
some |Ψ〉 for which (3.6) is negative, e.g. [6].
collection of N unentangled non-interacting subsystems
is represented by a product state
|Ψ〉 = |Ψ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ΨN 〉 (3.10)
in the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of the subsys-
tems distinguished by the superscripts. But, as pointed
out by Dio´si [29], the probabilities (3.6) for histories
(α1, · · · , αN ) of the collection will not generally obey the
usual product rule, that is
p(α1, · · · , αN ) 6= p1(α1) · · · pN(αN ) (3.11)
where the p is for the collection of subsystems and the
pi are computed for the individual ones, both from (3.6).
That is because the real part of a product of numbers is
not generally the product of their real parts. However,
we will show that the probabilities for settleable bets do
obey this rule in the next subsection.
B. Recorded Histories
As mentioned in the Introduction, a prescription such
as (3.6) for extending probabilities to all histories is not
enough to formulate quantum mechanics for closed sys-
tems. We must also identify those sets of alternative
histories that constitute the basis for settleable bets and
show that the usual rules of probability theory hold for
the extended probabilities assigned to them.
A widely accepted way of settling a bet on an event A
is to use a record of whether A occurred that is accessible
to both parties to the bet and deemed reliable by both.
Indeed, bets often include a specification of what records
will be used to settle them. Bets on histories of events
can be settled by reliable records of the events in those
histories.
Records of a set of histories can be idealized as a set of
alternatives at one time that are correlated exactly with
the alternatives constituting the histories. More specifi-
cally by exact records12 of a an exhaustive set of exclusive
histories {Cα} we will mean a set of orthogonal projec-
tion operators {Rβ(trec)}, one for each history, with trec
greater than the last time in the history Cα, such that
p(β, α) ≡ Re〈Ψ|RβCα|Ψ〉 = δβαRe〈Ψ|Cα|Ψ〉 = δβαp(α) .
(3.12)
Sets of alternative histories for which projections {Rβ}
satisfying (3.12) exist will be called exactly recorded sets
of histories. Summing (3.12) over α and using (3.1)
yields the following alternative expression for the ex-
tended probabilities of exactly recorded histories
p(α) = 〈Ψ|Rα|Ψ〉, (recorded histories) . (3.13)
12 In previous work (eg [30]) we have referred to operators Rα satis-
fying relations of similar character to (3.12) as generalized records
to emphasize that they do not necessarily have the properties of
accessible records discussed below.
6The real part in (3.12) is not necessary because the ex-
pected value of any projection is always real. Further-
more, the expected value of a projection is always pos-
itive. Thus we see that the extended probabilities of
exactly recorded sets of histories satisfy all the rules of
usual probability theory. They are probabilities not just
extended probabilities.
The extended probabilities of recorded histories also
satisfy the usual rule for the probabilities of unentangled,
non-interacting subsystems. Consider a collection of N
such subsystems whose state is given by (3.10). Records
of the histories of all the subsystems Rα1···αN will be
products of the records for the subsystems, viz
Rα1···αN = R
1
α1 ⊗ · · · ⊗RNαN . (3.14)
The extended probability p(α1, · · · , αN ) will be the real
part of the product of the 〈Ψk|Ckαk |Ψk〉 for each subsys-
tem. But since these are real for recorded histories [cf.
(3.13)] we have
p(α1, · · · , αN ) = p1(α1) · · · pN (αN ) (3.15)
C. Decoherent Sets of Histories and Settleable Bets
Recorded histories for which there exist R’s satisfying
(3.12) could be taken to define the notion of a settleable
bet. However, a stronger condition which is satisfied ap-
proximately by realistic records is that there exist R’s
which satisfy
RαCβ |Ψ〉 = δαβCβ |Ψ〉. (3.16)
We can call histories satisfying this condition strongly
recorded and those only satisfying (3.12) weakly recorded.
Evidently the former implies the latter. Realistic records
are in fact strong records to a good approximation as we
discuss in the next section.
Medium decoherence — the vanishing of quantum in-
terference between any pair of histories — is a necessary
condition for strong records. Specifically (3.16) implies
[cf (A.7)] that with |Ψα〉 ≡ Cα|Ψ〉
〈Ψα|Ψβ〉 = 〈Ψ|C†αCβ |Ψ〉 = 0 , α 6= β . (3.17)
Conversely, exact medium decoherence (3.17) implies
that there exist records satisfying (3.16). In fact, exact
medium decoherence implies that there are many sets
{R(trec)} of exhaustive and exclusive projections satis-
fying (3.16). The simplest case is to take the Heisen-
berg picture projections on the subspaces spanned by the
{|Ψα〉}, Rα ≡ Proj{|Ψα〉}, and assign them a time trec
later than the last time in the history Cα. The orthogo-
nality of the |Ψα〉 implied by medum decoherence ensures
that these Rα are orthogonal.
Requiring exact strong records and exact medium de-
coherence are thus the same thing. The existence of
strong records reduces to a calculable condition (3.17)
on the sets of alternatives alone. That is a considerable
advantage over a condition formulated just in terms of
the existence of records like (3.12).
In this paper, we will take the existence of strong
records or equivalently medium decoherence as the min-
imal requirement for settleable bets. When account is
taken of necessary approximations (Section III.D), the
notions of extended probability supplied by (3.6) and
medium decoherence defined by (3.17) can be taken as
the fundamental elements in a quantum mechanics of
closed systems.
IV. APPROXIMATE DECOHERENCE AND
REALISTIC RECORDS
A. Approximate Decoherence
Perhaps the most important examples of sets of alter-
native coarse-grained histories are those which describe
the wide ranges of place, epoch, and scale on which the
laws of classical physics hold approximately in this quan-
tum universe (e.g. [9, 31].) The sets of histories defining
this quasiclassical realm do not decohere exactly. Rather
they decohere to an approximation well beyond the ac-
curacy to which we could conceivably check their pre-
dictions, or, indeed, beyond the accuracy the physical
situation in which they apply can be manageably mod-
eled. Crude estimates of the overlap ǫ between branches
of this quasiclassical realm [32, 33] give numbers of the
qualitative form ǫ ∼ 10−E where E ∼ 1020.
Approximately decohering sets of histories cannot be
exactly recorded. But we can expect records {Rα} that
are correlated with histories to an accuracy comparable
to ǫ, that is
|〈Ψ|Rα|Ψ〉 − Re〈Ψ|Cα|Ψ〉| < ǫ. (4.1)
This means that the extended probabilities for histories
could be outside the range [0, 1], but not by much. For
example we could have negative values of Re〈Ψ|Cα|Ψ〉
only if
|〈Ψ|Rα|Ψ〉| < ǫ, |Re〈Ψ|Cα|Ψ〉| < ǫ. (4.2)
For all practical purposes these deviations from the range
[0, 1] are negligible. In fact, as discussed in Section V, a
tiny amount of coarse graining can be expected to give
sets of histories with probabilities satisfying all the usual
rules.
Some degree of approximation seems to be necessary
to formulate a quantum mechanics of alternative histo-
ries of a closed system. Perhaps this is not surprising for
a theory whose outputs are probabilities. The applica-
tion of probability theory inevitably involves subjective
choices. For instance, how small does a probability for
an event have to be before we act as if it were precluded?
This subjective uncertainty permits the theoretical im-
precision we have discussed. In the present instance,
7extended probabilities obey all the rules of probability
theory exactly except for being in the range [0, 1] . The
approximation comes in providing a realistic notion of
settleable bet. Intuitively that seems a natural place to
put it.
B. Realistic Records
The identification of recorded sets of histories with set-
tleable bets did not require that the records were acces-
sible to human IGUSes, only that they exist in the sense
of (3.16). In many instances the records that arise from
mechanisms of decoherence are not accessible to us. In
the classic example of Joos and Zeh [34], a dust grain is
in a superposition of positions deep in interstellar space.
Alternative coarse-grained histories of its position are de-
cohered though its interaction with CMB photons scat-
tering off it. The states of the scattered photons contain
a record of the histories of grain’s position. But this
record is not accessible to us. The photons left with the
speed of light at the time of scattering.
The histories of the quasiclassical realm are defined by
averages of conserved quantities such as energy, momen-
tum, and number over suitable spatial volumes. A record
of the history may be contained in degrees of freedom in-
ternal to these volumes or in the variables themselves
[35, 36] but we typically can’t get at them.
For these reasons, human bettors will usually have re-
quirements beyond (3.16) on the records used to settle
their bets. For example, human IGUSes may want to
restrict the notion of settleable bet to sets of histories
whose records have any or all of the following proper-
ties: (1) The records are in variables other than those
constrained by the coarse grainings defining the histo-
ries. (2) The records are in quasiclassical variables can
be immediately registered by our senses. (3) The records
persist for a time longer than that required for human
perception (∼ .1s). (4) The records are of the outcomes
of measurements. (5) The records are accessible, right
here, right now on Earth with current technology at bear-
able cost. Such records will typically be less precisely
correlated with the histories than is in principle possible
consistent with limitations like (4.1).
While individual bettors may want restrict the notion
of record by criteria beyond (3.16), there is no reason to
incorporate such restrictions in a fundamental formula-
tion of quantum theory. Indeed, there is every reason
not to13. All the notions (1)-(5) are human specific and
none of them admits of a precise formulation. Requiring
strong records in the general sense of (3.16) is a precise
criterion for identifying sets whose extended probabili-
ties obey the usual rules of probabiltiy theory and that
13 Strong decoherence [30] may yield a more realistic but still gen-
eral notion of record.
therefore can be the basis of settleable bets.
V. COARSE GRAINING AND SETTLEABLE
BETS
Even a single negative extended probability in a set of
histories enough to show that its alternatives are not the
basis for a settleable bet. But not every set of histories
with positive probabilities is the basis of a settleable bet.
The set must decohere for that, and there are sets of his-
tories with all positive extended probabilities that do not
decohere. Indeed, these are just the linearly positive sets
[11] that do not decohere. A number of simple examples
were given in [6].
A. Coarse Graining Leads to Decoherence
Coarse graining is a route to decoherence and therefore
to settleable bets. We can see this using a simple mea-
sure of how far away a set of histories is from decoher-
ing. For this it is convenient to introduce the decoherence
functional of a set of alternative coarse-grained histories.
When a pure initial state is assumed, as here, this is
D(α, β) ≡ 〈Ψα|Ψβ〉 = 〈Ψ|C†αCβ |Ψ〉. (5.1)
A set decoheres exactly when the off-diagonal elements
of D vanish. A convenient measure of the absence of
decoherence is then
dec(D) ≡
∑
α6=β
|D(α, β)|. (5.2)
This vanishes when the set of histories is exactly deco-
herent.
Coarse graining decreases dec(D). Let {α} be a set of
histories and {α¯} coarse graining of it, that is, a partition
of {α} into an set of mutually exclusive classes. (See the
Appendix for further discussion and notation.) Then
D¯(α¯, β¯) =
∑
α∈α¯
∑
β∈β¯
D(α, β). (5.3)
Evidently
dec(D¯) ≤ dec(D) (5.4)
Continued coarsed graining will drive dec(D) towards
zero, decoherence, and settleable bets. Further coarse-
grainngs of decoherent sets remain decoherent. We will
illustrate this with two simple models, but first we discuss
the effect of coarse graining on extended probabilities.
B. Coarse Graining and Extended Probabilities
Coarse graining doesn’t always drive sets of histories
with extended probabilities outside the range [0, 1] to
8ones with probabilities within that range. For example
consider a set with extended probabilities p(α). Suppose
that some of these are less than zero and some are greater
than 1, all summing to unity. Coarse grain this set by
partitioning it into two classes. In the first put all the his-
tories with negative extended probabilities. In the second
put all the rest. One history has an extended negative
probability, the other has one larger than 1. This set has
no extended probabilities even in the range [0, 1]. The
only further possible coarse-graining is to combine both
sets into the trivial set with one history with probability
1.
More interesting results are obtained with restricting
to more sensible coarse-grainings. For instance, restrict
attention to sets of histories defined by chains of sets of
projections as in (1.1) that describe sequences of events
at a series of times. Restrict attention to coarse-grainings
that preserve this property. The extended probability of
a chain is not necessarily positive but it is always less
than 1
p(α) = Re[〈Ψ|Pnαn(tn) · · ·P 1α1(t1)|Ψ〉] ≤ 〈Ψ|Ψ〉 = 1.
(5.5)
In this case, coarse-graining will always decrease the total
negative extended probability
ptot.neg. ≡
∑
p<0
p(α). (5.6)
That is because any coarser grained set that includes a
negative extended probability history along with some
positive probabilities will make a smaller contribution to
the negative side of the ledger than those histories did
before.
C. Illustrative Examples
1. The Two-Slit Experiment
We consider the classic two-slit experiment illustrated
in Figure 1. We make the usual idealizations, in partic-
ular assuming that the electrons are initially in narrow
wave packets moving in the horizontal direction x, so that
their progress in x recapitulates their evolution in time.
We assume that the source is far enough from the first
screen that these wave packets can be analyzed into plane
waves propagating in the x direction with a distribution
peaked about a wave number k. Then, to a good approx-
imation, we can calculate the amplitudes for detection by
considering just the plane wave with peak wave number
k. A sketch of that analysis follows; for more detail see
[6].
Consider the coarse grained history (i, U) in which the
electron passes through the upper slit U and arrives in
one of an exhaustive set of exclusive ranges {∆i} of y.
From (3.6), the extended probability for this history can
be written
p(i, U) = Re(〈Ψ|Ψ(i,U)〉) (5.7)
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FIG. 2: Coarse-graining in the two-slit experiment shown
in Figure 1. The top figure shows the extended probabiity
density ℘(y,U) for the electron to pass though the upper
slit U and arrive at a point y on the screen for the values
kD = kd = 60 where k is the wave number of the electron.
The amplitude a has been assigned arbitrarily which is why
there is no scale on the vertical axis. The extended probability
density is negative for some range of y. The next two figures
show the effect of coarse graining by dividing y into bins of
equal width ∆. In the first figure k∆ = 5 and in the second
it is 20. The final coarse graining has all positive extended
probabilities even though there is still significant interference
between the histories.
where |Ψ(i,U)〉 = C(i.U)|Ψ〉 is the branch state vector for
this history. Similar expressions hold for p(i, L), |Ψ(i,L)〉,
etc. Introducing configuration space representatives this
9can be written
p(i, U) =
∫
∆i
dyRe[Ψ∗(y)ΨU (y)] (5.8a)
≡
∫
∆i
dy℘(y, U) (5.8b)
where Ψ(y) = ΨU (y)+ΨL(y) and ℘(y, U) is the extended
probability density for passing through the upper slit and
arriving at point y on the screen.
The amplitude ΨU (y) is approximately given by
ΨU (y) ≡ aeikSU (y)/SU (y) (5.9)
where
SU (y) ≡
[
(d/2− y)2 +D2
] 1
2
(5.10)
is the distance from the upper slit to the point on the
detecting screen labeled by y and a is a constant ampli-
tude. With this, the extended probability density ℘(y, U)
to arrive at y having passed through U defined in (5.8b)
works out to be
℘(y, U) =
|a|2
SU
{
1
SU
+
1
SL
cos[k(SL − SU )]
}
. (5.11)
To see the effect of coarse graining on the extended
probabilities p(i, U) consider the simple case shown in
Figure 2 when all the ranges have the same size ∆. The
top figure shows ℘(y, U) which has a range of negative
values showing that the histories (y, U) and (y, L) are
not the basis of a settleable bet. With increasing coarse
graining — increasing ∆ — the extended probabilities
eventually become positive even though there is signifi-
cant quantum interference (∼ D/k∆d) between the two
histories. Continued coarse graining will reduce that in-
terference until the medium decoherence condition is sat-
isfied ∫
∆
dyRe [Ψ∗L(y)ΨU (y)] ≈ 0. (5.12)
That requires a ∆ much larger than the spacing between
the interference fringes and much larger than that re-
quired merely for positive probabilities, but then the his-
tories are the basis of a settleable bet.
2. The Three Box Example
The three-box example introduced by Aharonov and
Vaidman [37] for other purposes provides another ex-
ample of effect of coarse-graining on extended extended
probabilities.
Consider a particle that can be in one of three boxes,
A, B, C in corresponding orthogonal states |A〉, |B〉, and
|C〉. For simplicity, take the Hamiltonian to be zero, and
suppose the system to initially be in the state
|Ψ〉 ≡ 1√
3
(|A〉+ |B〉+ |C〉). (5.13)
Consider further a state |Φ〉 defined by
|Φ〉 ≡ 1√
3
(|A〉+ |B〉 − |C〉) (5.14)
and denote the projection operators on |Φ〉, |A〉, |B〉,
|C〉 by PΦ, PA, PB, PC respectively. Denote with A¯
the negation of A (“not in box A”) represented by the
projection PA¯ = I−PA. The negations Φ¯, B¯, C¯ and their
projections PΦ¯, PB¯, and PC¯ are similarly defined.
As a simple example consider a set of histories defined
by whether the particle is in box A, B, or C at a certain
time given that it is in the state |Φ〉 at a later time. Since
H = 0 the values of these times are not important, only
their order. This set can be thought of as a simplified
version of a three-slit experiment analogous to the two-
slit one considered above (see, e.g. [38]).
There are three histories in this set distinguished by
which box the particle is in at the intermediate time.
Their class operators are
PΦPA, PΦPB, PΦPC . (5.15)
Their extended probabilities are given by (3.6), e.g.
p(Φ, A) = Re〈Ψ|PΦPA|Ψ〉. (5.16)
A little calculation gives
p(Φ, A) = 1/9, p(Φ, B) = 1/9, p(Φ, C) = −1/9.
(5.17)
The conditional extended probabilites for which box the
particle was in given |Φ〉, e.g p(A|Φ) ≡ p(Φ, A)/p(Φ), are
p(A|Φ) = 1, p(B|Φ) = 1, p(C|Φ) = −1. (5.18)
Evidently, there is no settleable bet possible on which of
the three boxes the particle was in at the intermediate
time given |Φ〉. Thus, there is no contradiction between
the unit probabilities assigned to the exclusive alterna-
tives A or B in (5.18) [39].
This set of histories can be coarse-grained in three dif-
ferent ways by combining two of the three histories into
one coarser grained one. For instance, the set of histo-
ries defined by whether the particle is or is not in box
A at the intermediate time given |Φ〉 at the later time is
represented by the chains PΦPA and PΦPA¯. These three
mutually incompatible sets have the extended probabili-
ties
p(A|Φ) = 1, p(A¯|Φ) = 0, (5.19a)
p(B|Φ) = 1, p(B¯|Φ) = 0, (5.19b)
p(C|Φ) = −1, p(C¯|Φ) = 2. (5.19c)
It is easy to check that the first two coarse grained sets
are medium decoherent. Thus it is possible to make a set-
tleable bet on the coarse grained alternatives of whether
the particle was in box A or not in A at the intermedi-
ate time, in B or not in B, but not on C or not in C.
Needless to say in this highly simplified model the gener-
alized records associated with the settleable alternatives
are trivial and nothing like those that might be available
in a realistic three-slit experiment.
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VI. COMPARISON WITH DECOHERENT
HISTORIES QUANTUM THEORY
This section compares the formulation of quantum me-
chanics in terms of extended probabilities (EP) with the
decoherent histories quantum mechanics (DH) summa-
rized in the Appendix. DH and EP agree on the predic-
tions for exactly decoherent settleable bets. The proba-
bilities are the same because of the equality between (3.5)
and (3.6). EP can be viewed as extension of DH that
assigns extended probabilities to all sets of histories.
However, DH and EP differ on how they incorporate the
quantum mechanical arrow of time and how they deal
with approximate decoherence. This section describes
these differences. There are no experimental differences,
but they may be different starting points for extending or
modifying quantum theory as we discuss in Section VIII.
A. Arrows of Time
In DH the expression for the probabilities of time his-
tories is [cf (A.6)]
p(α) =‖ |Ψα〉 ‖2=‖ Cα|Ψ〉 ‖2 . (6.1)
This is not not time neutral. The state |Ψ〉 is on one end
of the chain of projections in Cα [cf. (1.1)] and there is
nothing on the other end. This time asymmetry is called
the quantum mechanical arrow of time. The end of the
chain with the state is conventionally called the past and
the other end is called the future. Histories are time
ordered with the earliest times assigned to the past14 15.
By contrast, as pointed out by Goldstein and Page [11],
the extended probability formula for EP (3.6) is time
neutral. The extended probabilities p(α) are the same
as whether the chains Cα have one time order or the re-
verse C†α. Rather time asymmetry in EP arises from the
definition of a settleable bet as a recorded set of histo-
ries. In expression (3.12), the record operators are after
the histories not before.
This time asymmetry is consistent with the second law
of thermodynamics. Physical records in the quasiclassical
realm are often created by irrreversible processes in which
entropy increases. An impact crater on the moon, an
ancient fission track in mica, and the printed ink of on
this page are all examples. Consistent with the second
law, records of events in histories are more likely to be
14 This order can be reversed by a CPT transformation since field
theory is invariant under CPT , but that does not alter the fact
that there is an asymmetry between the past and the future.
15 Quantum mechanics can be formulated time neutrally using both
initial and final conditions [40, 41]. Then both the quantum me-
chanical and thermodynamic arrows of time arise from the differ-
ence between a special initial condition |Ψ〉 and a final condition
of indifference represented by a density matrix proportional to
the unit matrix.
at the end of history furtherest from an initial condition
of low entropy than at the beginning.16.
In DH there is an intrinsic quantum mechanical arrow
of time which is consistent with the second law if the en-
tropy was low in the early universe. In EP the quantum
mechanical arrow of time arises from the second law in a
fundamental framework which is time neutral.
B. Approximate Decoherence
We next turn to the comparison between DH and
EP when decoherence is not exact. For realistic sets of al-
ternatives such as those defining the quasiclassical realm
(e.g.[9, 31]) the decoherence condition (3.17) will only be
satisfied to an excellent approximation
〈Ψα|Ψβ〉 ≈ 0 , α 6= β . (6.2)
When decoherence is approximate the probabilities for
histories defined by EP and DH will not coincide exactly.
Rather
pDH(α) = pEP(α) − Re
∑
β 6=α
〈Ψ|C†βCα|Ψ〉. (6.3)
While pEP(α) obey the probability sum rules (3.8) the
DH probabilities will obey them only to an approxima-
tion defined by the standard of decoherence.
For realistic sets of histories such as those defining a
quasiclassical realm we expect to have the probabilities
of DH and EP agree, and the rules of probability theory
satisfied to an accuracy fare beyond that to which the
probabilities can be checked, the sum rules verified, or,
indeed, the physical situation correctly modeled (e.g.[32],
Sec. II.11). Put differently we expect that the loss from
the unfair bets that are permitted because the probabil-
ity sum rules are slightly violated to be negligable for
any set of bets that could be settled in the accessible
universe [33]. Thus for all practical purposes DH and
EP are equivalent.
However, DH and EP manage the approximations that
are inevitable in any formulation of quantum theory dif-
ferently. In DH the sum rules of probability theory are
approximately satisfied as are the correlations defining
records. In EP the sum rules of probability theory are
satisfied exactly although at the expense of introducing
extended probabilities with values outside the range 0
to 1. The approximations are confined to the level of
correlation required between histories and the records by
which bets are settled. Some may find this a more natural
and satisfactory way of organizing inevitable theoretical
uncertainty17.
16 For a slightly amplified discussion of this see [6] and also [9].
17 We can also compere EP with linear postivity LP. Goldstein and
Page [11] used (3.6) to introduce a very weak notion of deco-
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VII. THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
This paper has introduced a new understanding of ex-
tended probabilities lying outside the range of 0 to 1.
They represent alternatives that are not the basis for set-
tleable bets because there are no records to settle them.
With this understanding, quantum mechanics can be for-
mulated as a stochastic theory predicting extended prob-
abilities by positing two fundamental ingredients:
• A unique set of alternative fine-grained histories
{h}.
• A fundamental distribution w(h) giving the ex-
tended probability for each fine-grained history in
the set.
A set of coarse-grained histories is a partition of the set
of h’s into an exhaustive set of exclusive classes cα, α =
1, 2, · · · . The extended probability of each coarse-grained
history cα is
p(α) =
∑
h∈cα
w(h). (7.1)
EP quantum mechanics is defined by fundamental dis-
tributions of the form (3.6) incorporating both state and
dynamics. To give a concrete example suppose that the
h’s were four dimensional field configurations φ(~x, t) on
a fixed, background spacetime. The fundamental distri-
bution on field configurations between an initial time t′
and a final time t′′ would be
w[φ(~x, t)] =
Re{Ψ∗[φ′′(~x), t′′) exp{iS[φ(~x, t)]/h¯}Ψ[φ′(~x), t′)}
(7.2)
where φ(~x, t′) = φ′(~x) and φ(~x, t′′) = φ′′(~x). The func-
tional S[φ(~x, t)] is the action for field configurations be-
tween t′ and t′′. The Schro¨dinger picture wave functional
Ψ[φ′(~x), t′) is the state in the field representation at t′ and
similarly for the functional at t′′. The usual measure for
functional integration over fields is prescribed to define
the sums in (7.1). The oscillation of the exponential in
herence called linear positivity. Eq. (3.2) for probabilities was
replaced by (3.6) and the decoherence condition (3.3) was re-
placed by the linearly positive condition
Re〈Ψ|Cα|Ψ〉 ≥ 0, all α .
for all histories in the the set {α}. Evidently from (3.5) medium
decoherence implies linear positivity but not the other way
around. Probability assignments in quantum theory would be
restricted to linearly positive sets of histories. We have taken
medium decoherence as the minimal requirement for a settleable
bet. LP extends probabilities beyond that [6] to sets of his-
tories with positive extended probabilities are not the basis of
settleable bets. Nothing seems to be lost and a some theoretical
unity gained by extending the notion further to all histories as
here.
(7.2) shows that w[φ(~x, t)] will be negative for some fine-
grained histories so that no bet on fine-grained histories
is possible. This is the fundamental distribution defining
usual quantum field theory.
The assumption of a unique set of fine-grained histo-
ries prefers one representation over others in formulat-
ing quantum theory — the field representation in the
case of (7.2). Transformation theory relating this pre-
ferred representation to others would be a derived or ap-
proximate notion. This is an old idea already implicit
in Feynman’s sum-over-histories formulation of quantum
mechanics (e.g. [42, 43]) for which the fundamental dis-
tribution (7.2) is a particular expression.18 Similarly, all
the usual apparatus of quantum theory especially its 3+1
formulation in terms of the unitary evolution of states on
spacelike surfaces is not posited but rather derived from
this fundamental distribution (7.2) [42].19
In classical physics probabilities represent ignorance of
the true physical situation. We use these probabilities to
bet on what this situation is, and settle bets by determin-
ing it. The characteristic feature of quantum mechanics
is that there are alternative situations that can be de-
scribed but for which it is not possible to settle a bet on
which is the true situation. Extended probabilities ex-
tend the classical notion of ignorance to include all such
non-settleable bets.20
VIII. TESTING, EXTENDING AND
MODIFYING QUANTUM THEORY
Why bother formulating the quantum mechanics of
closed systems in different ways? The answer is not in
order to find different predictions for experiment. By def-
inition these are the same as they are for EP and DH as
discussed in Section VI. Were they different we would
18 The idea of a preferred representation is developed for non-
relativistic quantum mechanics in [42]. It has advocated by many
in various situations. See, e.g. [38, 44].
19 Such a derivation requires a fixed background spacetime foliated
by a spacelike surfaces on which the histories {h} are single val-
ued. Neither of these prerequisites can be expected when space-
time geometry is a quantum dynamical variable (e.g. [45, 46]).
In such cases the Feynman’s spacetime formulation of quantum
theory is more general than a 3+1 formulation.
20 A fundamental distribution like w[φ(~x, t)] in (7.2) is like a clas-
sical distribution but valued in extended probabilities. The vari-
ables φ(~x, t) are then like local hidden variables. The limitations
of Bell’s inqualities for local hidden variable theories do not hold
if the probabilities are not positive (e.g [47, 48]). Can we then
say that one history is ‘realized’ and the extended probabilities
represent our ignorance of what it is? The answer depends on
what is meant by ‘realized’. If it required that there be a way of
checking which history is realized to make this assertion then the
answer is ‘no’. The extended probabilities mean that there is no
way of doing this. But if only consistency with our experience is
required to make the assertion then the answer is ‘yes’. For the
author’s views on this kind of question see [49].
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have different theories that could be distinguished exper-
imentally.21
One reason for new formulations is that they may be
conceptually clearer to individual scientists because they
are closer to incorporating their theoretical prejudices.
EP for instance is closer to classical physics in many ways
than some more standard formulations as we have dis-
cussed.
But a deeper and more important reason is that refor-
mulations of quantum mechanics provide different start-
ing points for extending, modifying, and generalizing it.
Experiment provides one motivation for this, and the
search for a final theory another.
A. Experimental Tests of Quantum Mechanics
Today there is not one shred of experimental evidence
against quantum mechanics and much to be found for it
on scales ranging roughly from those probed by the high-
est energy particle accelarators (10−17cm) to delicate ex-
periments on condensed matter systems (10−5cm). That
is a wide range of scales but still small compared to
the range of 10−33cm to 1028cm that characterize the
phenomena considered in contemporary physics. Recent
experiments have extended the range on which quan-
tum mechanics has been or will be tested (e.g. [50–54]).
To motivate and analyze future experiments that probe
quantum mechanics at new scales it would be very use-
ful to have alternative theories. These should agree with
quantum mechanics where it has been tested so far, but
differ from it on scales where it has not yet been tested
and be consistent with the rest of modern physics such
as special relativity. But as Steve Weinberg puts it [55]:
“It is striking that so far it has not been possible to find
a logically consistent theory that is close to quantum me-
chanics other than quantum mechanics itself”.
EP may help. It reduces quantum theory to the spec-
ification of a certain fundamental distribution of w(h) of
extended probabilities (e.g (7.2)). It should be possible
to construct alternative theories by considering distribu-
tions that are close to those of quantum theory but differ
from on the length scales where it has not been tested.
B. Emergent Quantum Theory
Generalizations of quantum theory are necessary for
a unified final theory of our particular universe and of
all the fundamental dynamical interactions that occur
21 Indeed, the more restricted approximate quantum mechanics of
measured subsystems (the Copenhagen formulation) is adequate
for the prediction of all laboratory measurements. Neither EP or
DH is necessary for that.
within it. The textbook quantum mechanics of mea-
surements and observers already has to be generalized
to apply to a closed system like the universe. DH and
EP provide such generalizations. But quantum theory
has to be generalized further to accommodate quantum
spacetime when the fixed spacetime geometries in which
unitary state evolution operates are no longer available.
Generalizations have been sketched [45, 46] but the gen-
eralizing the fundamental distribution of EP may provide
others.
The structure of quantum mechanics incorporates no-
tions of spacetime [46] and is closely linked to spacetime
ideas such as the notions of initial and final conditions.
Could quantum mechanics itself emerge from something
deeper along with an emergent notion of spacetime? The
generalizations permitted by extending the fundamental
distribution provided by EP may help provide an answer.
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APPENDIX A: THE QUANTUM MECHANICS
OF CLOSED SYSTEMS
Largely to explain the notation this appendix gives
a bare-bones account of some essential elements of the
modern synthesis of ideas constituting the decoherent
histories quantum mechanics of closed systems [3–5]. We
fix attention on themodel universe in a box described at
the beginning of II.
The most general objective of quantum theory is the
prediction of the probabilities of individual members of
sets of coarse-grained alternative histories of the closed
system. For instance, we might be interested in alter-
native histories of the center-of-mass of the Earth in its
progress around the Sun, or in histories of the correlation
between the registrations of a measuring apparatus and
a property of the subsystem.
Alternatives at one moment of time can always be re-
duced to a set of yes/no questions. For example, al-
ternative positions of the Earth’s center-of-mass can be
reduced to asking, “Is it in this region – yes or no?”, “Is
it in that region – yes or no?”, etc. An exhaustive set
of yes/no alternatives is represented in the Heisenberg
picture by an exhaustive set of orthogonal projection op-
erators {Pα(t)}, α = 1, 2, 3 · · · . These satisfy
∑
α
Pα(t) = I, and Pα(t)Pβ(t) = δαβPα(t) , (A.1)
showing that they represent an exhaustive set of exclusive
alternatives. In the Heisenberg picture, the operators
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Pα(t) evolve with time according to
Pα(t) = e
+iHt/h¯Pα(0) e
−iHt/h¯ . (A.2)
The state |Ψ〉 is unchanging in time.
An important kind of set of histories2 is specified by
a series of sets of single time alternatives {P 1α1(t1)},
{P 2α2(t2)}, · · · , {Pnαn(tn)} at a sequence of times t1 <
t2 < · · · < tn. The sets at distinct times can differ and
are distinguished by the superscript on the P ’s. For in-
stance, projections on ranges of position might be fol-
lowed by projections on ranges of momentum, etc. An
individual history α in such a set is a particular sequence
of alternatives (α1, α2, · · · , αn) ≡ α and is represented
by the corresponding chain of projections called a chain
or class operator
Cα ≡ Pnαn(tn) · · ·Pα1(t1) . (A.3)
A set of histories like one specified by (A.3) is generally
coarse-grained because alternatives are specified at some
times and not at every time and because the alternatives
at a given time are typically projections on subspaces
with dimension greater than one and not projections onto
a complete set of states. Perfectly fine-grained sets of
histories consist of one-dimensional projections at each
and every time.
Operations of fine and coarse graining may be defined
on sets of histories. A set of histories {α} may be fine -
grained by dividing up each class into an exhaustive set of
exclusive subclasses {α′}. Each subclass consists of some
number of histories in a coarser-grained class, and every
finer-grained subclass is in some class. Coarse graining is
the operation of uniting subclasses of histories into bigger
classes. Suppose, for example, that the position of the
Earth’s center-of-mass is specified by dividing space into
cubical regions of a certain size. A coarser-grained de-
scription of position could consist of larger regions made
up of unions of the smaller ones. Consider a set of histo-
ries with class operators {Cα} and a coarse graining with
class operators {C¯α¯} . The operators {C¯α¯} are then re-
lated to the operators {Cα} by summation, viz.
C¯α¯ =
∑
α∈α¯
Cα , (A.4)
where the sum is over the Cα for all finer-grained histories
α contained within α¯.
For any individual history α, there is a branch state
vector defined by
|Ψα〉 = Cα|Ψ〉 . (A.5)
When probabilities can be consistently assigned to the
individual histories in a set, they are given by
p(α) =‖ |Ψα〉 ‖2=‖ Cα|Ψ〉 ‖2 . (A.6)
However, because of quantum interference, probabilities
cannot be consistently assigned to every set of alternative
histories that may be described. The two-slit experiment
in Figure 1 provides an elementary example: An electron
emitted by a source can pass through either of two slits
on its way to detection at a farther screen. It would be
inconsistent to assign probabilities to the two histories
distinguished by which slit the electron goes through if
no “measurement” process determines this. Because of
interference, the probability for arrival at a point on the
screen would not be the sum of the probabilities to arrive
there by going through each of the slits. In quantum
theory, probabilities are squares of amplitudes and the
square of a sum is not generally the sum of the squares.
Negligible interference between the branches of a set
〈Ψα|Ψβ〉 ≈ 0 , α 6= β , (A.7)
is a sufficient condition for the probabilities (A.6) to be
consistent with the rules of probability theory. The or-
thogonality of the branches is approximate in realistic
situations. But we mean by (A.7) equality to an accu-
racy that defines probabilities well beyond the standard
to which they can be checked or, indeed, the physical
situation modeled [32].
Specifically, as a consequence of (A.7), the probabili-
ties (A.6) obey the most general form of the probability
sum rules
p(α¯) ≈
∑
α∈α¯
p(α) (A.8)
for any coarse graining {α¯} of the {α}. Sets of histories
obeying (A.7) are said to (medium) decohere. As L. Dio´si
has shown [29], medium decoherence is the weakest of
known conditions that are consistent with elementary no-
tions of the independence of isolated systems22. Medium-
decoherent sets are thus the ones for which quantum
mechanics makes predictions of consistent probabilities
through (A.6). The decoherent sets exhibited by our uni-
verse are determined through (A.7) and by the Hamilto-
nian H and the quantum state |Ψ〉. The term realm is
used as a synonym for a decoherent set of coarse-grained
alternative histories.
An important mechanism of decoherence is the dissipa-
tion of phase coherence between branches into variables
not followed by the coarse graining. Consider by way of
example, a dust grain in a superposition of two positions
deep in interstellar space [34]. In our universe, about
1011 cosmic background photons scatter from the dust
grain each second. The two positions of the grain be-
come correlated with different, nearly orthogonal states
of the photons. Coarse grainings that follow only the
position of the dust grain at a few times therefore corre-
spond to branch state vectors that are nearly orthogonal
and satisfy (A.8).
22 For a discussion of the linear positive, weak, medium, and strong
decoherence conditions, see [6, 30, 56].
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Measurements and observers play no fundamental role
in this general formulation of usual quantum theory. The
probabilities of measured outcomes can be computed and
are given to an excellent approximation by the usual
story. But, in a set of histories where they decohere,
probabilities can be assigned to the position of the Moon
when it is not receiving the attention of observers and
to the values of density fluctuations in the early universe
when there were neither measurements taking place nor
observers to carry them out.
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